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Abstract
Conflict between Muslims and Christians in Moluccas (1999-2002) is one 
of  the worst conflicts in Indonesia which brings great damage in all fields of  
human life. The significant result of  reconciliation can be found in Central 
Government’s effort called as Malino Declaration II. This paper aims to find 
a positive contribution on formulating the key for facing the fact of  religious 
plurality in Indonesia by revisiting the Malino Declaration II. By critically 
analyzing the discourse of  the Malino Declaration contents, it concludes that 
Malino Declaration is shaky for several reason, (1). The role of  Government 
is so dominant, thus Government is in the safe position. Therefore, it is 
understandable why many people view Government aims to “clean” its mistakes 
in the conflict. (2). Military as a tool was not only ineffective and bias, but 
also it caused mass killings under the banner of  national stability. (3) Malino 
Declaration indicates obviously and strongly that the conflict is pure between 
Muslim and Christian communities in Moluccas, as the result the blame is 
theirs, (4) contain of  declaration gives an impression that the participants who 
are representative of  each community do not have enough room in expressing 
and waging in dialogue. In other words, Malino Declaration is still far from 
genuine dialogue. 
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[Konflik antara Muslim dan Kristiani di Maluku (1999-2002) adalah 
salah satu konflik terburuk di Indonesia yang menyebabkan kerusakan 
luar biasa di segala bidang kehidupan manusia. Hasil rekonsiliasi yang 
signifikan adalah usaha pemerintah pusat terkait perumusan Deklarasi 
Malino II. Dengan meninjau kembali Deklarasi Malino II, tulisan ini 
bertujuan untuk menemukan kontribusi positif  dalam merumuskan kunci 
dalam menghadapi fakta pluralitas agama di Indonesia. Dengan menganalisis 
secara kritis wacana isi Deklarasi Malino, dapat disimpulkan bahwa 
Deklarasi Malino lemah dengan alasan: pertama, peran pemerintah sangat 
dominan sehingga pemerintah ada di posisi aman. Karenanya, dapat dipahami 
mengapa banyak orang melihat pemerintah bermaksud “membersihkan” 
kesalahannya dalam konflik tersebut; kedua, militer sebagai alat tidak efektif  
dan bias serta menyebabkan pembunuhan massa di bawah bendera kestabilan 
nasional; ketiga, deklarasi Malino mengindikasikan secara jelas dan tegas 
bahwa konflik tersebut antara komunitas Muslim dan Kristen di Maluku 
sehingga kesalahan adalah pada kedua kelompok ini; keempat, isi deklarasi 
memberikan kesan bahwa para partisipan yang mewakili masing-masing 
komunitas tidak mendapatkan ruang yang cukup dalam mengekspresikan 
dan melaksanakan dialog. Dengan kata lain, Deklarasi Malino masih jauh 
dari makna dialog yang sebenarnya.
Keywords: Moluccas Conflict, Malino Declaration, Separatism and 
Radicalism, Discriminative Politics
Introduction
The fact that human beings live in the plural world is not a new 
issue. Unlike before, plurality, which has been presenting in terms of  
gender, belief, religion, ethnicity, and culture, obtains much attention 
nowadays. As Amin Abdullah mentions, the fact of  plurality is natural 
at first; it becomes problematic when it encounters with other issues 
especially economy, religion, and politics.1 
Focusing on religious plurality, the encounter between religious 
1  M. Amin Abdullah, Dinamika Islam Kultural: Pemetaan atas Wacana Keislaman 
Kontemporer (Bandung: Mizan, 2000), p. 69.
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societies and empiric realities, for instance, does not always take a 
constructive dialogical discourse.2 Tensions and conflicts among 
religions have been existed from the beginning of  human history. This 
is inevitable in the light of  the janus-faced characteristic of  religion. In 
the one hand, religion provides inclusive, universal, and transcending 
values, but in the other, religion is exclusive, particular, and primordial.3 
Recently, interreligious dialogue is convinced as one of  sufficient paths 
to understand religious plurality.  
From the beginning of  Indonesian independence, the founding 
fathers faced with religious plurality and its potentiality in tension and 
conflict. In 1945, Japan agreed to form Badan Penyelidik Usaha-Usaha 
Kemerdekaan (BPUPKI, Investigating Committee for Preparatory Work for 
Indonesian Independence). The members of  this committee consist of  
Indonesian and Japanese. They projected a constitution and determined 
the foundation of  Indonesian state. The debate arose when Muslim 
figures wanted Islam as the foundation of  the state, whereas nationalists 
chose nationality as the foundation. The result of  this committee was 
called as Jakarta Charter. Although compromise occurred, there was 
something bothering concerning the first principle: ‘Ketuhanan dengan 
kewadjiban mendjalankan sjari’at Islam bagi pemeluk-pemeluknja’ (Godhead 
with the obligation for adherents of  Islam to carry out Islamic law). In 
August 7, Panitia Persiapan Kemerdekaan Indonesia (PPKI, Committee for 
Preparation of  Indonesia’s Independence) was formed and the members 
were dominated by nationalists. In the meeting of  PPKI, the objection 
of  Christians in the East Indonesia raised concerning the seven words. 
Then, in August 18, 1945, the members agreed to change the seven 
words by ‘Yang Maha Esa,’ thus the formulation of  the first principle 
became ‘Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa.’  It is important to note that not only 
2 Bakhtiar Effendy, Masyarakat Agama dan Pluralisme Keagamaan: Perbindangan 
mengenai Islam, Masyarakat Madani, dan Etos Kewirausahaan (Yogyakarta: Galang Press, 
2001), p. 5.
3 Ibid, p. 7-8.
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Christians who refused the seven words, but also several Muslims.4 At 
the same time, the suggestion of  Muslim figures on creating Department 
of  Religious Affairs was rejected. These two events brought a tension 
between Muslim leaders and nationalists. In January 1946, Sutan Sjahrir 
decided to establish Department of  Religious Affairs. There is an issue 
that this step was to compromise with Muslim group because the Dutch 
tried to put back its power in Indonesia. Thus, Department of  Religious 
Affairs can be regarded as the real form of  ideological compromise.5 
In the Demokrasi Terpimpin (Guided Democracy) Era, the tension 
between Partai Komunis Indonesia (PKI/Indonesian Communist 
Party) and Nahdatul Ulama (NU) occurred. Saifuddin Zuhri, the 
Minister of  Religious Affairs who also a member of  NU, “pushed” 
President Soekarno to create Penetapan Presiden (president decree) No. 
1 1965 concerning ‘Pencegahan Penyalahgunaan dan/atau Penodaan Agama’ 
(Prevention of  Misuse and/or Defamation of  Religion). 
After Gerakan September 30, 1965, the immense conversion 
among Indonesian brought the tension and conflict between Muslims 
and Christian. Christianization became a big issue. In facing the 
phenomenon, Muslim group demanded several things: first, the 
spreading of  religion is only addresses to non-religion people. Second, 
building house of  worship has to be approved by the local residents. 
Third, government must controls the foreign aids to religious institutions. 
Fourth, interreligious married is forbidden. Fifth, religious teachings in 
school have to be teach by the teacher who has the same religion with 
the student. The New Order tried to fulfill these demands.6 
In the late of  nineteen sixtieths, religious tension and conflict broke 
and demanded Indonesian Government to find a proper solution. Terms 
4 See Fatimah Husein, Muslim-Christian Relations in the New Order Indonesia: the 
Exclusicist and Inclusivist Muslims’ Perspectives (Bandung: Mizan, 2005).
5 Mujiburrahman, “Islam dan Hubungannya dengan Agama-Agama Lain di 
Indonesia.” Workshop Islam dan Pluralisme yang diselenggarakan the WAHID Institute 
di Griya Kusuma Indah (GKI), Pacet, Mojokerto, Jawa Timur, 6 November 2007.
6 Mujiburrahman, “Islam dan Hubungannya... 
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of  interreligious dialogue as the solution raised and Mukti Ali became 
the pioneer. As the Minister of  Religious Affairs in 1972, he had the best 
position to promote and apply interreligious dialogue in Indonesia. Then, 
many interreligious dialogues were conducted in Indonesia, sponsored 
by both government and private institutions.7
In the short words, the New Order seemed to struggle on diversity. 
SARA (Suku, Agama, Ras, Antar-Golongan/Ethnicity, Religion, Race, 
Inter-Group Relation) is the famous slogan during the New Order 
era. For the struggle, from 1969, the New Order Government forbade 
public meetings which aimed to support and promote Jakarta Charter, 
therefore ideological Muslim figures could not perform in public sphere.8 
Nevertheless, the struggles seem to find a failure when the great violent 
conflict between Muslims and Christians in Poso and Moluccas occurred 
in the end of  the New Order. 
Conflict in Moluccas is one of  the worst conflicts in Indonesia 
which brings great damage in all fields of  human life. In addition, it 
took a lot of  time in finding the solution. The conflict started in the 
beginning of  1999 and showed a progress until finding a solution in 
the beginning of  2002. The efforts of  reconciliation were conducted 
by INGOs local NGOs, groups of  local society, Local Government, 
and Central Government. The significant result can be found in Central 
Government’s effort called as Malino Declaration II. Nevertheless, several 
protests and debates on the content of  the declaration arise. Several 
scholars have made researches on the strengths and the weaknesses 
7 Such as in Jakarta (July 27-28, 1972 ), Cirebon (July 26, 1972), Bandung (August 
28- September 3 1972), Surabaya (December 9-13, 1972, Yogyakarta (February 6-10, 
1973), Jakarta (April 8-11, 1973), Banjarmasin (March 29-31 1973), Medan (April 24-28, 
1973), Ujung Pandang (April-May, 1973), Manado (November, 13-17, 1973), Palembang 
(January 8-11, 1974), Banjarmasin (March 29-31, 1974), Kupang (October 29-November 
1, 1974), Pontianak (December 5-9, 1974), Medan (November 20-23 1975), Ujung 
Pandang (January 25-February 5, 1976), Samarinda (January 24-27, 1977), Kupang (April 
18-21, 1977), Palangkaraya (December 5-8, 1977) (see. Zakiah Darajat, et al. 1996).  
8  Mujiburrahman, “Islam dan Hubungannya... 
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of  Malino Declaration II. This paper does not aimed to explore the 
strengths and the weaknesses of  Malino Declaration II directly, but to 
find a positive contribution on formulating the key for facing the fact of  
religious plurality in Indonesia by revisiting Malino Declaration as one of  
interreligious dialogues in Indonesian historical experiences. To obtain 
this aim, this paper discusses three main issues: discriminative politics, 
separatism and radicalim, and military neutrality.
Declaration of  Malino for Moluccas: Coming to the Terms (?)
In December 20, 2001, Indonesian government brokered a meeting 
in Malino for ending a conflict in Poso which is later on called as Malino 
Declaration for Poso or Malino Declaration I. This declaration was 
regarded successful, therefore Jusuf  Kalla, the Coordinating Minister 
for People’s Warfare, initiated to make such declaration for conflict in 
Moluccas. Many people viewed that the conflict in Moluccas was more 
complicated than in Poso, thus such declaration would be ineffective 
for Moluccas. Nevertheless, Jusuf  Kalla believed that there would be 
no chance for such meeting in the future.9 For that reason, in February 
12, 2002, under the coordination of  Jusuf  Kalla and Soesilo Bambang 
Yudhoyono, the Coordinating Minister for Political and Security Affair, 
35 people of  each community of  Muslim and Christian met in Malino, 
South Sulawesi for three days and came to the terms 12 points as follows, 
1. Ending the conflict and all kinds of  violence.
2. The restoration of  the supremacy of  the law in a just, clear and 
balanced way; a professional and impartial stance by the security 
forces.
3. The rejection of  all forms of  separatism, among others the 
Republic of  South Moluccas, that threaten the integrity and 
sovereignty of  the unitary state of  the Republic of  Indonesia.
9 Adreas A. Yewangoe, “Reconciliation in the Indonesian Context,” in Von 
Sicard (eds.), LWF Studies, Dialogue and Beyond: Christian and Muslim Together on the Way, 
(Switzerland: The Lutherian World Federation, 2003), p. 121.
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4. Being a part of  the unitary state, all Moluccas citizens have the 
right to stay, work and be active in all parts of  the state. Likewise, 
all non-Moluccas citizens have the same right in the Province 
of  Maluku, if  they respect the local culture and support law and 
order.
5. All organizations that carry arms without permission, will be 
prohibited and have to surrender their arms under the threat of  
legal steps. Groups from outside the Moluccas that cause unrest 
are obliged to leave the area.
6. An independent investigation team will be installed to investigate 
the beginning of  the violence on 19 January 1999, the role of  
organizations such as the Front Kedaulatan Maluku, the RMS, Kristen 
RMS, the Laskar Jihad and Laskar Kristus, the matter of  forced 
conversion and the violation of  human rights.
7. The phase return of  displaced persons to their places of  
origin.
8. The government will support the reconstruction and rehabilitation 
in the material as well as in the non-material field.
9. Emphasis ill be laid upon the necessity of  neutral stance by the 
military and the police.
10. In sermons in churches and mosques, the need of  mutual 
respect will be stressed continuously.
Support for the reconstruction and rehabilitation of  Pattimura-
university in balanced way.
After this declaration, huge numbers of  Military arrived in 
Moluccas and pushed extremists went out from Moluccas back to their 
hometown, Java. Violence decreased until two third, but it still occurred at 
local level.10 In July 27, 2002, for instance, a bomb exploded in a Christian 
market and caused 53 people died. In September 2002, the bombing 
10 Biro Demokrasi, “Hak-Hak Asasi dan Perburuhan,” Laporan Kebebasan Agama 
International, December 18, 2003, Public Affairs Section, p. 1. 
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explosion occurred in other place and 3 people died.11 Nevertheless, 
the declaration of  Malino for Moluccas is one of  “the platforms of  
conflict resolution” which has obtained the most significant support 
from government and tied Muslims and Christian in Moluccas who were 
positioned as conflicting parties.12 In addition, this declaration showed a 
public general wish for ending the violence.13 
Several scholars and observers found, the declaration is shaky and 
still leads to another conflict for several reasons. For example, many 
people view that the dominant role of  political elites is so obvious, thus 
it is failed in representing the honesty of  communities. In addition, the 
implementation of  the declaration in economy particularly is very slow.14 
According to Malik, the strengths of  the declaration are in the media 
campaign, facilitator figures and the stimulus for law enforcement, 
whereas the weaknesses are the declaration is still fire fighting vision, top 
down approach, dominant elite participation and instant pattern. As the 
result, the declaration is ineffective as a resolution conflict in Moluccas 
besides no genuine dialogue between the parties.15 Thus, do Muslims and 
Christian come to the terms in the Malino Declaration for Moluccas? 
The following discussion focuses on three issues are essential for me in 
the Malino Declaration, which leads us to answer this question.
Discriminative Politics
During, Ducth colonial, territories in Moluccas were divided based 
on religion. Therefore, in the present, we found Soa-Soa and Negeri-Negeri 
11 Ibid, p. 15.
12 John Pieris, Tragedi Maluku: Sebuah Krisis Peradaban (Jakarta: Yayasan Obor 
Indonesia, 2004), p. 273.
13 European Commision Conflict Prevention and Crisis Management Unit, 
“Report on the EC conflict prevention assessment mission to Indonesia,” March 2002.
14 See John Pieris, “Tragedi Maluku and Ichsan Malik, The Malino Process 
in Conflict Resolution in Poso and Maluku,” in Violent Internal Conflicts in Asia Pacific: 
Histories, Political Economies and Policies (Jakarta: Yayasan Obor Indonesia, LIPI, LASEMA 
–CNRS, KITLV, 2005.)
15 Ichsan Malik, “The Malino Process in Conflict Resolution,” p. 277-278.
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where its administration was based on religion (Negeri Salam and Negeri 
Sarani). Ducth, itself, provided a great opened opportunity to Christians 
than to Muslims. This becomes the beginning of  high tension between 
the two communities, especially on job opportunity and bureaucracy.16 
Significant changing for societies in Moluccas occurred in the New 
Order when modernization in all fields of  human life has begun. Amount 
of  migrants drastically increased, thus Moluccas has been inhabited by 
Butonese, Bugisnese, Makasarnese, Minahasanese, Javanese, and Chinese. 
Most of  these migrants are Muslims. As the result, the relation of  ethnic-
religion groups changed.17 The changing started in 1971 when Muslim 
population in Moluccas increased while amount of  Christians decreased.18 
Job opportunity, which had dominated by Christian before, became 
opened for indigenous and migrant Muslims especially in bureaucracy. 
This phenomenon is potential for conflict between Muslim and Christian, 
and it has been proved that it is not impossible to be open conflict when 
power and economic sharing became unfair. Issues on Islamization, 
Christianization, and economic dominant increased especially when 
the crisis in 1997 occurred.19 In 2000-2001, mass conversion took place 
and people assume that local leaders involved in it.20 Due to the crisis, 
social, security and public order were bothered and led to a conflict 
between Migrant Muslims of  Bugisnese and indigenous Christians as 
well as between indigenous Muslims and Christians. The issue is not 
only about social-economy but also about religious identity.21 Based on 
the facts above, many scholars view that the seed of  conflict has been 
16 Pieter Tanamal and Lambang Trijono, “Religious Conflict in Maluku: In 
Search of  Religious Community Peace,” in Lambang Trijono (ed.), The Making of  Ethnic 
and Religious conflict in Southeast Asia, Majalah Kumpulan Karangan (Yogyakarta, 2004), 
p. 323-324.
17 See Ziwar Effendi, Hukum Adat Ambon Lease (Jakarta: PT. Pradnya, 2001), 
p. 15.
18 Pieter Tanamal and Lambang Trijono, “Religious Conflict in Maluku,” p. 231.
19 Ibid., p. 236-237.
20 Biro Demokrasi, Hak-Hak Asasi dan Perburuhan, p. 18.
21 Pieter Tanamal and Lambang Trijono, “Religious Conflict in Maluku...,” p. 231.
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existed in the structural fact of  ethnic and religious group relations in 
the past and the present. 
Another problem, which existed along with the phenomenon 
above, is the New Order Government put much more on uniformity than 
the variety of  cultures and ethnics. This policy operated under the flag 
of  national stability where Military became a tool. As the result, Central 
Government did not provide enough room for people in the grassroots 
to use their local wisdoms for solving their own problems. In other side, 
the New Order Government did not have an efficient policy concerning 
integration. Uncertainty identity for migrants as Anak Dagang not Anak 
Negeri is one of  the examples.22 Because of  this policy, the New Order 
had no power to deal with the conflict in Maluku. As Ecip found, in 1992 
local traditional leaders in Maluku had used the strategy of  traditional 
land mapping movement in the conflict.23 
After the falling of  New Order Government, Indonesian people 
hope that democratization walks in the right track. One aspect of  
democratization programs is decentralization. Indonesian Minister for 
Home Affair and Regional Automony, Surjadi Soedirdje, explains that 
decentralization is the significant component of  democratic reform 
in Indonesia.24 However, this process is not without a risk because 
“Democratization and decentralization create the basis for provoking 
and heightening the ethnic-religious conflict,”25 as we found in Moluccas 
and other regions in Indonesia.
The historical phenomenon above shows that the changing of  
dominant position in Moluccas occurred for years and this has to get 
more attention. However, it is uneasy to accept the followers of  other 
22 Djohan Effendi, “Reconciliation in the Indonesian Context,” in Von Sicard 
(eds.), LWF Studies, Dialogue and Beyond..., p.113 & 236.
23 S. Sinansari Ecip, Menyulut Ambon, Kronologi Merambatnya Berbagai Kerusuhan 
Lintas Wilayah di Indonesia (Yogyakarta: Penerbit Mizan, 1999), p. 50-51.
24 Alan Tidwell and Charles Lerche, “Globalization and Conflict Resolution,”.
International Journal of  Peace Studies, Vol. 9. No. 1 Spring/Summer 2004, p. 52. 
25 Ibid, p. 51.
Epistemé, Vol. 12, No. 2, Desember 2017 ж 467
Mega Hidayati: Revisiting Interreligious Dialogue.................
religion or different ethnic person become more dominant in bureaucracy. 
This phenomenon also seems to demonstrate that a discriminative 
politics has been existed from the beginning of  Moluccas formed. 
Malino Declaration (item no. 4) reminds Moluccans and Migrant, Muslim 
and Christian to realize this historical phenomenon and pushes the 
communities to compete fairly. Nevertheless, it is important to note that 
Central Government must also respect on local culture, thus province 
obtains proper policy and intervention in the right time. In other words, 
cultivating the awareness of  the importance of  local culture and of  
acceptance of  plurality for all parties is needed. However, religious and 
ethnic differences are potential for conflict and tension such as separatism 
and radicalism. 
Separatism and Radicalism 
Malino Declaration for Moluccas (item no.3) emphasizes that 
Moluccans have to reject all forms of  separatism because it threatens the 
integrity of  state. In its item, the declaration directly mentions Republik 
Maluku Selatan (RMS, Republic of  South Moluccas) as the example 
of  separatism movement. Is the mention of  RMS as an example of  
separatism because RMS arises once more in Moluccas or it is merely 
the using of  collective memory strategy by Government? 
In 1950, conflict between Republik Maluku Selatan and other 
Moluccans occurred. RMS supported by Ducth wanted Moluccas to be 
independent while the others supported by Indonesia wished to joint 
with Indonesian state. In 1961, Indonesian government succeeded in 
wiping the RMS ‘s dream out. Later on, many members of  RMS involved 
in Forum Kedaulatan Maluku (FKM, Moluccas Sovereign Front). For 
this reason, government views FKM as a “dangerous” organization. 
In January 28, 2003, Alex Manuputty, the leader of  Forum Kedaulatan 
Maluku was jailed for 3 years due to the accusation of  subversion.26 
26 Biro Demokrasi, “Hak-Hak Asasi...,” p. 16.
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The emphasis of  separatism in Malino Declaration is indeed 
different with what Tidwell and Lerche state about Moluccas. They found 
that “There is no separatism active movement in Maluku such as in Aceh 
and Papua. RMS sought the separation but it is not a large force and has 
no military means.”27 According to Pieris, the stressing of  RMS issue in 
Malino Declaration is aimed to shift the main issue of  the conflict. The 
members of  RMS who then joint with FKM might bring a conflict but 
it is just because TNI failed in bringing the end of  conflict. Even, there 
is an impression that TNI let the emergence of  RMS. Besides that, Pieris 
views that Malino declaration (item no. 3) reflects the formulation of  
discriminative politics since separatism is not the only one that threatens 
Indonesian integrity. Sectarianism, which aims to shift Pancasila ideology 
such as Laskar Jihad and Mujahidin, is also potential for threatening 
Indonesian integrity, even Laskar jihad and Mujahidin also provided 
political and logistic supports by armed troops in Moluccas. But, why 
do not both movements have the same position as RMS and FKM? 
For Pieris, this shows that Muslim and Christian political atmosphere 
is imbalance and proves that Muslim thinkers are clever in formulating 
Malino Declaration faced with inexperienced Christian thinkers in 
politics.28 He continued that discriminative politics is also indicated clearly 
in Malino Declaration (item no. 6), which mentions FKM, Kristen RMS 
and Laskar Kristus related to a forced conversion and the violation of  
human right compared to Laskar Jihad. This formulation brings moral 
disadvantages in Christian party. Kristen RMS and Laskar Kristus should 
not be mentioned in the formulation since it will indicate that Christian 
more involved in the conflict than Muslims did.29
The items of  Malino Declaration explained above seem to be 
contradictive with other item (no. 5) which states that “All organizations 
that carry arms without permission, will be prohibited …” As Pieris states, 
27 Alan Tidwell and Charles Lerche, “Globalization...,” p. 51.
28 John Pieris, Tragedi Maluku..., p. 274-277.
29 Ibid., p. 278-279.
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this item is a mess in the structure since it means that all organizations 
that carry arms with permission is allowed. In addition, this item 
shows that no clear punishment for the members of  the movement or 
organization who carry arms will be taken. Normatively, it ignores the 
principle of  justice and law order.30  Meanwhile, according to FKM, jihad 
is international terrorism in the banner of  religion, therefore it has to be 
abolished, but in Malino Declaration, it is protected.31 In the following 
passage, we find why several scholars and organizations have paid more 
attention on Laskar Jihad in Moluccas.
Laskar Jihad came from Java to Moluccas in May 2000. This 
movement was formed in January 30, 2000 in Yogyakarta by Ja’far 
Umar Thalib, the leader of  Forum Komunikasi Ahlussunnah wal Jama’h 
[FKAJW,]. Laskar Jihad, which is paramilitary, aimed to defend Muslims 
from religious persecution.32 For this purpose, Laskar Jihad had a formal 
structure of  Indonesian military such as brigades, battalion, companies, 
platoons, teams, and intelligence service.33 
The tragedy in al Fatah mosque, Ambon in 1999, had brought Ja’far 
Umar thalib to establish Laskar Jihad. This movement more focused 
on Muslims who killed by RMS with Christianity as the political back 
up.34 Put simply, Laskar Jihad wanted to respond on Christian villages 
attacks.35 Besides that, as International Crisis Group (ICG) found, “the 
massacre by Christian of  over 400 Muslims at Tabelo, North Maluku 
during the last week of  December 1999, had inflamed Muslim sentiment 
30 Ibid, p. 278.
31 Front Kedaulatan Maluku (FKM), “Pernyataan Sikap Terhadap Hasil 
Perjanjian Malino untuk Maluku” 15 Februari 2002.
32 Jon Goss, “Understanding Maluku War: an Overview of  the Sources of  
Communal Conflict and Prospect for Peace,”Cakalele. Vol. 11-12, 2004.
33 Noorhaidi Hasan, “Faith and Politics: the Rise of  Laskar Jihad in the Era of  
Transition in Indonesia,” Indonesia 73 (April 2002), p. 159.
34 Abdul Mu’ti, the Chair of  Central Board Muhammadiyah Youth “the Cause 
of  Radicalism of  Muslim Communities in Indonesia: a View from Within,” p. 3.
35 Jon Goss, “Understanding Maluku...,”
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throughout Indonesia.”36 
In April 6, 2000, six representatives of  Laskar Jihad came to the 
President Abdurrahman Wahid and asked him to protect Muslims in 
Moluccas, while at the same time, in front of  Merdeka palace, hundreds of  
Laskar Jihad warriors demonstrated. Thalib stressed that if  Government 
was unable and unwilling to protect Muslims in Moluccas, they were 
going to do that by themselves.37 In April 30, 2000, 111 Laskar Jihad 
fighters arrived in Ambon and in the next months, other hundreds fighters 
followed. The number achieved 7.000 fighters.38 
After Malino Declaration, Laskar Jihad made armed attack in April 
28, 2002. This is viewed as an effort to interrupt Malino Declaration and 
became one of  reasons to arrest Laskar Jihad leader, Ja’far Umar Thalib.39 
Finally, Laskar Jihad was disbanded in October 2002, all members 
banished and backed to Java without law process. Meanwhile Majlis 
Mujahidin leaved Maluku before Laskar jihad was disbanded. Ja’far Umar 
Thalib arrested for sharpening religious violence in Moluccas, but, in 
January 30, Jakarta Court released him. Human Right activists view that 
high-level politics has involved in it. This was enforced by Major General 
Sjafrie Sjamsudin’s statement that Laskar Jihad could not be categorized as 
the threatening of  national integrity.40 Meanwhile, Ja’far emphasizes that 
they leaved Moluccas not because of  government policy but because of  
the fatwa of  Syeikh Robi’ bin Hadi al Makholi from Saudi Arabia. Ja’far 
said that Laskar Jihad came to Moluccas based on Syeikh Robi’s fatwa 
and they leaved Moluccas also based on his fatwa.41 
36 International Crisis Group (ICG) Asia Report No. 31. “Indonesia: The search 
for Peace in Maluku” (Jakarta, February 8, 2002), p. 5.
37 Sukidi Mulyadi, ”Violence Under the Banner of  Religion: The Case of  Laskar 
Jihad and Laskar Kristus,” in Studia Islamica, Vol. 10 (2), 2003, p. 83.
38 See Noorhaidi Hasan, “Faith and Politics...,” p. 197.   
39 Angel Rabasa and John Haseman, The Military and Democracy in Indonesia: 
Challenges, Politics, and Power (Pittsburg: RAND, 2002), p. 97.
40 Biro Demokrasi, “Hak-Hak Asasi..,” p. 15-16.
41 Shoelhi, 2002 in Abdul Mu’ti p.5.  
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Using the banner of  religion in Moluccas conflict is also found 
in Laskar Kristus movement. Laskar Kristus derived from the Petra 
Church in Moluccas. The Petra Church organized GMB (Gerakan 
Maluku Berdoa;  Moluccas prayers Movement) as a response for the sake 
of  Moluccan safety.42 Laskar Kristus was established in 1998 and had 
several commanders. Agus Wattinema is one of  the commanders who 
claimed leading 20,000 warriors in Ambon, and 200 children warrior called 
as Agas.43 An interview with Doug Bandow, senior fellow at the Cato 
university, Wattinema asked Bandow to tell to American Christians that 
they were needed in Ambon.44 In March 20, 2001, Wattinema was killed. 
Laskar Kristus was less organized than Laskar Jihad. In addition, it 
did not have a great armed training, network and Media as Laskar Jihad 
had. This fact seems to be one of  reasons, according to Pieris, for not 
mention Laskar Kristus in Malino Declaration (item no. 6). I agree with 
Pieris if  Christian RMS should not be mentioned in Malino Declaration 
(item no. 6) since RMS has been mentioned and there is no reason to 
make an emphasis on Kristen RMS. Moreover, RMS was not divided 
into two: Christian RMS and non-Christian RMS.  This is different with 
the present of  Laskar Kristus in Moluccas if  we look at the description 
above. Finally, the questions are If  separatism and radicalism were so 
dangerous, why are they able to develop in this country? Why does the 
tendency on using violence under the banner of  religion grow up? Why 
do military and POLRI (Indonesian National Police) seem to let them 
develop? How far does Government pay attention on this case? As a 
tool of  Government, can Military provide an effective strategy and be 
in a neutral position?
42 Tabloid Adil, “Tarung Dua Laskar di Jakarta,” November 22, 2001.
43 See, Herry Mohammad et.al., “Mencampakkan Dendam Generasi Agas,” 
Gatra, No.39 August 17, 2001.  
44 Sukidi Mulyadi, ”Violence Under the Banner..,” p. 91-92.
472 ж Epistemé, Vol. 12, No. 2, Desember 2017
Mega Hidayati: Revisiting Interreligious Dialogue.................
Effectiveness and Neutrality of  Military 
Soon after conflict had broken in the beginning of  January 
1999, Government sent military to Moluccas. Later on, Moluccas was 
determined as a province under Military Aid (Bantuan Militer, BANMIL) 
until June 1999. In June 26, 2000, through President Decree no. 88, 
Abdurrahman Wahid decided both Moluccas and North Moluccas 
provinces to be in Civil Emergency Situation in order to make security 
troops effective. Thousands of  Military personnel came to all villages 
in Moluccas and North Moluccas for at least three years.45 In the early 
of  2001, violence declined and the neutral zone of  interaction between 
Muslim and Christian community could be protected. In addition, 
Brigadier General I Made Yasa, a Hindu, was chosen as the commander 
of  Pattimura Force to maintain the neutrality of  security forces.46 Is 
Military as a tool effective and neutral?
Based on the result of  International Crisis Group’s investigation, 
during the first 18 months, Military was ineffective in ending violence, 
even it also provided contribution to the conflict. They had a weapon and 
the tactic of  “shoot kill” orders that led the death increased. Moreover, 
they failed to be neutral since they gave different services for two 
communities, even actively supported their co-religionists.47 
Military leaders often state the slogan “protecting the unity state 
of  Republic of  Indonesia” and “devastating provocateur” when they 
faced the problem of  separatism and social conflicts in several regions in 
Indonesia. As the result, the status of  Civil Emergency and the Military 
forces always become the answer for the solution of  violence actions 
in Maluku and other regions. In the process, Kasim found that Human 
45 See, Ifhdal Kasim, et.al., Tutup Buku dengan “Transitional Justice”? Menutup 
Lembaran Hak-Hak Asasi Manusia 1999-2004 dan Membuka Lembaran Baru 2005 (Jakarta: 
Lembaga Studi dan Advokasi Masyarakat (ELSAM), 2005), p. 33.
46 Ibid.
47 ICG Asia Report No. 31. “Indonesia: The search for Peace in Maluku,” 
(Jakarta, February 8, 2002), p. 1.
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Right violation such as killing, capture, disappearing people, torture, 
increased.48 Extrajudicial killing and summary execution appeared when anti-
guerrilla operation and the separation of  people based on ethnic and 
religion occurred.49 Military and Brimob often involved in the killings 
of  civil people without law process. The justifications of  this action are 
to avoid worse mutual attack between two communities and by claiming 
that killed people were provocateur, rioter, or agitator. Even, several 
members of  FKM, who criticized strongly the brutal action of  Military 
in overcoming the conflict in Moluccas, were accused as prolongation 
of  RMS. In August 1, 2003, several leaders were captured and took to 
court for the accusation of  coup.50 
Central Government policy in dividing Moluccas into two 
provinces, Moluccas and North Moluccas, failed in decreasing the conflict. 
Several scholars view this policy is just to fulfill the demand of  local 
elite politicians. Moreover, along with the developing province, Korem 
Pattimura was developed to be the same as KODAM level. However, 
this is also unsuccessful in ending the conflict, even it led Maluku and 
North Moluccas to the status of  Civil Emergency in June 2000.51  After 
Malino Declaration, Government sent Military to Moluccas to push 
people in order to agree with contain of  declaration while groups that 
do not accept the declaration is forced to be “silent.”52 
The neutrality of  military in the conflict is also questionable. The 
statement of  Irjen Pol. Muhammad Firman Gani, who became Chair 
of  Region Police in Moluccas, has proved that many military personnel 
could not be neutral in the conflict. Gani acknowledges that military and 
POLRI personnel involved in the conflict by providing moral supports 
and weapons to people who were in the conflict.53 Meanwhile, in its 
48 Ifhdal Kasim et.al., Tutup Buku..., p. 33.
49 Ibid, p. 35.
50 The Situation in Maluku/Moluccas-Report 2003, p. 35.
51 Ifhdal Kasim et.al., Tutup Buku..., p. 33.
52 Ibid.
53 “Kesaksian Polisi di Ambon”, Kompas, August 6, 2001.
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report, ICG states that when conflict in Moluccas was in the top, TNI 
(Indonesian National Armed Forces) personnel rent their weapons to 
Muslim Militants.54 
From the fact above, it is surprising that in Malino Declaration, 
there is no item mentions an investigation for Military. It is indeed 
reasonable when government (including TNI and POLRI) is viewed to 
“clean” their mistake in the conflict by making emphasis and indication 
that only Muslim and Christian who involved in the conflict. In fact, 
State (Government, civil elites, TNI and POLRI) has to be responsible 
for the mass killings in Moluccas. Besides that, many people believe that 
Government, TNI and POLRI actions and policies contribute on lateness 
of  the ending of  conflict (FKM, 2002).
The description above answers why National Investigation Team 
created by government is doubted. Pieris, for instance, state that it is 
difficult to believe the team since the conflict in Moluccas involved many 
groups including TNI, POLRI and Indonesian Government itself. In 
addition, Indonesian Government with TNI and POLRI have a great 
power to push all components thus the result of  the investigation team 
is opposite with truth, justice, and honesty.55 Finally, although Malino 
Declaration (item no. 10) emphasizes that military has to be in neutral, 
investigation related to Military action in Moluccas for years is also 
needed.
Conclusion
Moluccans have experienced significant changing in their economic, 
social, and political life as the result of  modernization, democratization, 
and decentralization. Amount of  migrants, for instance, increases 
drastically and causes the changing of  composition in terms of  religion 
and ethnic. Job opportunity and bureaucracy, which is dominated by 
Christian since Dutch colonial, become more open for Muslim in the New 
54 Biro Demokrasi, “Hak-Hak Asasi dan Perburuhan...,” p. 15. 
55 See, John Pieris, Tragedi Maluku..., 
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Order Era. In later development, Muslims are dominant in bureaucracy. 
Unfortunately, the New Order policy on uniformity was not followed 
by the strategy of  integration; on the contrary, the New Order used 
Military as a tool in operating this policy. Discriminative politics seems 
to colour Moluccan’s society throughout the history of  Moluccas. The 
changing and shifting had led a tension between Muslim and Christian 
communities which in turn became opened conflict in January 1999. 
In Malino Declaration (item no. 4), this case becomes one of  focuses 
in searching reconciliation. This declaration stresses the same right for 
all Moluccas citizens including migrants if  they respect local culture. 
Unfortunately, government does not treat local culture with respect, 
thus there is no enough room for local cultural wisdom as the solution 
of  the conflict.
During the conflict, separatism and radicalism became an important 
issue. Government raises the issue of  separatism by Republik Maluku 
Selatan and Forum Kedaulatan Maluku as prolongation of  RMS, as one of  
factors which causes conflict. The display of  RMS flags in its anniversary 
April 25, 2002 by Forum Kedaulatan Maluku (FKM) gave an impression 
that RMS has still existed. However, as several scholars emphasize, this 
fact is weak; on the contrary, Government wants obviously to shift the 
real cause of  conflict by using collective memory on RMS. In addition, 
as found, RMS in Moluccas cannot be categorized as an active separatist 
movement as in Aceh and Papua since RMS has no military means and 
large force. Although Indonesia has to be cautious of  separatism, the 
emphasis of  RMS twice: RMS and Kristen RMS in Malino Declaration 
(item no. 6) are questionable. In addition, no sufficient facts about RMS 
are divided into Kristen RMS and Non-Kristen RMS.
Radicalism such as Laskar Jihad and Laskar Kristus is another issue 
in Malino Declaration besides separatism. Both Laskar Jihad and Laskar 
Kristus justified violence under the banner of  religion. The former is 
organized than the latter. Besides that, Laskar Jihad, which came from 
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Java, more or less brought a new tension in Moluccas. Government’s 
late preventive action related to the arrival of  Laskar Jihad is disputed. 
It seems that Military as government’s tools let this happen, even 
Military rent their military means to militants. Therefore, government 
investigation team (item no. 6) and the neutrality of  military (item no. 
9) are doubted. Many evidences show that Government and Military 
involved in escalating the conflict or in practicing the violation of  law 
and human right, but no investigation is conducted for them. In addition, 
the ineffective strategy of  Military in ending the conflict is not evaluated. 
The discussion above enforces the view that Malino Declaration 
is shaky for several reason, among them (1). The role of  Government 
is so dominant, thus Government is in the safe position. Therefore, it is 
understandable why many people view Government aims to “clean” its 
mistakes in the conflict. (2). Military as a tool was not only ineffective 
and bias, but also it caused mass killings under the banner of  national 
stability. (3) From point (1) and (2), Malino Declaration indicates 
obviously and strongly that the conflict is pure between Muslim and 
Christian communities in Moluccas, as the result the blame is theirs, (4) 
contain of  declaration gives an impression that the participants who are 
representative of  each community do not have enough room in expressing 
and waging in dialogue. In other words, Malino Declaration is still far 
from genuine dialogue. 
One and half  year after Malino Declaration, in September 2003, 
Maluku and North Maluku were liberated from the State of  Civil 
Emergency. Sporadic violence has still existed and community is still 
divided into two separating Muslim and Christian sectors, which attacked 
each other (Maluku Media Center, 2003). We have to acknowledge that 
reconciliation often takes a long time and more or less Malino Declaration 
has given contribution in achieving it. Nevertheless, interreligious dialogue 
after the conflict is more complicated than interreligious dialogue aimed at 
preventive. Interreligious dialogue, which mirrors honesty and openness, 
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is still needed at all levels.
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